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I.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 78-2-2(3) (j).

The Utah Supreme Court

transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals by Order dated
April 4, 1994.
II.

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD
OF APPELLATE REVIEW

The sole issue presented for review is:
In light of the record in this case, did the trial court
commit reversible error in ruling that Living Scriptures, Inc.
("LSI") did

not

intentionally

waive

its

right

to

insist

on

compliance with the payment terms of the Lease and the Memorandum
and that LSI did not engage in conduct that would estop LSI from
insisting on that right?
Waiver and estoppel are "highly fact-dependent" questions,
which involve the application of broad legal standards to specific
facts.
their

See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994).
determination

is

one

profitably review de novo."

appellate

court

As such,

that

an

"cannot

Id.

Rather, in reviewing a trial

court's ruling in this area, the appellate court must accord that
ruling with "a measure of discretion." Id. at 939.
III. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUES,
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances,
rules, or regulations

that are determinative

appeal.
1

of the

issue on

IV.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.
LSI brought this action against Appellant MichaelJohn Kudlik

("Kudlik") because of Kudlik's numerous breaches of the Lease and
the Memorandum

and to recover

unpaid

rent,

interest

thereon,

attorney's fees and costs, treble damages for unlawful detainer,
and possession of a certain building and property located at 3685
Harrison Boulevard, Ogden, Utah (the "Premises").
B.

(R. 1-26.)

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Trial Court.
LSI filed its Complaint and a three-day Summons on August 27,

1993.

On September 2, 1993, Judge West entered an Order Regarding

Possession

Bond.

(R. at 93.)

That

same day, and again on

September 4, 1993, LSI served Kudlik with a Notice of Filing of
Possession

Bond

and

of

Remedies

Available

accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 6-8.5.

to

Defendant

(Id. at 94.)

requested a hearing within three days after service.

in

Kudlik

(Id.)

Judge West held a hearing on the possession bond issue on
September 8, 1993. Pursuant to that hearing, Judge West entered an
Order Regarding Restitution dated September 13, 1993, directing
Kudlik to pay the past-due rent, late fees, interest, and attorneys
fees owing in order to maintain possession of the Premises pending
a further hearing.

(R. at 66-69, 94.) Kudlik did not comply with

the terms of that Order.
On September 20, 1993, Judge West held a hearing on the two
issues

submitted

by

the

parties,
2

namely,

to

determine

the

reasonableness of LSI's attorney's fees and to determine if LSI had
waived or would be estopped from requiring timely performance from
Kudlik based on Kudlik7s having made four rental payments late.
(Tr. of September 20, 1993 Hearing at 2-3.) At that hearing, Judge
West determined that LSI's attorney's fees were reasonable, (id. at
36-37) , that LSI had not waived its right to timely performance
under the Lease or the Memorandum and that there was no basis for
estoppel against LSI, (id. at 32-33; R. at 95) , and that Kudlik had
been in unlawful detainer of the Premises since August 27, 1993.1
(Tr. of September 20, 1993 Hearing at 33; R. at 95.) Accordingly,
Judge West entered an Order of Restitution directing Kudlik to
restore possession of the Premises to LSI, (R. at 81-82), and
ordered Kudlik to pay the past-due rent, treble rent from August
27, 1993 to the date of the hearing, LSI's attorney's fees and
costs, and post-judgment interest.
C.

(R. at 98.)

Statement of Facts.
On or about June 26, 1985, Myrtle M. Crouch, as landlord, and

Jay Anderson and Dale Minson, as tenants, entered into a certain

1

Contrary to Kudlik's assertion in his brief, Judge West did
not find that LSI had "tolerated x. . . a pattern of payments that
were not being made.7" Brief of Appellant at 4. Rather, Judge
West found that, prior to January 25, 1993, Kudlik had slipped into
a pattern of making late payments, which caused LSI and Kudlik to
enter into a Memorandum of Understanding that established a payment
schedule for past-due payments and that required strict compliance
by Kudlik with the payment terms of Lease between the parties
thereafter.
(Tr. of September 20, 1993 Hearing at 32.) Judge
West's statement does not support Kudlik's new-founded assertion.
3

Lease agreement (the "Lease") concerning the Premises.2

(R. 92.)

All right, title, and interest of Myrtle M. Crouch under the Lease
and in and to the Premises was transferred and assigned to LSI.
(Id.)

The interest and obligations of Jay Anderson and Dale Minson

as tenants under the Lease were assigned to Kudlik.

(Id.)

Kudlik

is obligated to make all payments to LSI that were to be made as a
tenant under the Lease, including all rents during the term of the
Lease.

(Id.)

Kudlik is also obligated to perform all of the

covenants and obligations of a tenant under the Lease.

(Id.)

By February of 1993, Kudlik had failed to pay 1991 and 1992
real property taxes, as required by the Lease, and was two months
arrears in rent.

(Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 7; Tr. of

September 20, 1993 Hearing at 3, 23; Exhibit P-2 to September 20,
1993 Hearing, Memorandum of Understanding, R. 169, 182-84.)

LSI

contacted its attorney, who notified Kudlik that he was in default
under the Lease.

(Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 6-7; Tr. of

September 20, 1993 Hearing at 23.)

To assist Kudlik in curing his

defaults under the Lease, LSI and Kudlik entered into a

Memorandum

of Understanding dated as of January 25, 1993 (the "Memorandum")
pursuant to which, among other things, Kudlik

agreed

to

cure

existing defaults by making payments according to a specified
payment schedule and to thereafter make timely payments under the

2

The Lease

is included

as Exhibit

hereto.
4

"A" to the Appendix

Lease.3

(R. 92; Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 7; Tr. of

September 20, 1993 Hearing at 23.)

With regard to the timeliness

of payments required under the Lease, Paragraph 1 of the Memorandum
provides, in relevant part:
Any payment hereunder or under the Lease which is not
received by LSI on or before its due date shall not be
timely made and shall constitute a breach, . . . Kudlik
hereby expressly waives any defense, offset, recoupment,
reduction and/or counterclaim and any right of defense,
offset, recoupment, reduction and/or counterclaim for or on
account of any reason or event whatsoever to any liability
of Kudlik under this Agreement and/or the Lease.
(R. 182 f 1 (emphasis added).)

Similarly, Paragraph 2 of the

Memorandum provides, in relevant part:
Kudlik shall make all other payments which are or become
owed under the Lease in full and on time.
fid, at 1 2 (emphasis added).)4
The Memorandum also specifies that upon any default by Kudlik,
LSI is entitled to immediately terminate the Lease and all of
Kudlik's

rights

thereunder.

Paragraph

3 of

the Memorandum

provides:
In the event that Kudlik fails to timely make any payment
in full as due under this Agreement or the Lease or is
otherwise in breach or default under the Lease, LSI may,
without any notice to Kudlik and in addition to any other
rights and remedies available to LSI under this Agreement,
under the Lease, in equity or at law, immediately terminate
3

The Memorandum is included as Exhibit "B" to the Appendix

hereto.
4

The Lease provides that "[m]onthly lease payments shall be
paid in advance and shall commence on the effective date of this
Lease." (Lease § III, at 3.) The Lease also provides that "[t]ime
is of the essence of this Lease." (Id. § XV, at 6.)
5

the Lease and all of Kudlik's and his predecessors' rights
thereunder. Any such termination shall be effective upon
a declaration by LSI to that effect or upon LSI/s sending
to Kudlik a notice to that effect.
(Id, at 5 3.)
Moreover, pursuant to the Memorandum, LSI and Kudlik agreed
that any waiver by either party of any breach was not to be
construed as a continuing waiver of, or consent to, any subsequent
breach by the other party.

Accordingly, Paragraph 4.d. of the

Memorandum provides:
Any waiver by any party hereto of any breach of any kind or
character whatsoever by any other party, whether such
waiver be direct or implied, shall not be construed as a
continuing waiver of, or consent to, any subsequent breach
of this Agreement on the part of the other party.
(Id. at f 4.d.)
Kudlik made the past-due tax and rental payments according to
the payment schedule in the Memorandum.
20, 1993 Hearing, R. 169, 197.)

(Exhibit P-6 to September

Soon thereafter, however, Kudlik

once again fell in arrears by being delinquent in making his March,
April, and May 1993 rent payments.

(R. 197.)

During that time,

LSI had continually "bird dogged" Kudlik to make his payments.
(Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 7.)

In late July of 1993,

when it became clear to LSI that its efforts to get Kudlik to make
his rental payments on time had been unsuccessful, LSI once again
contacted its attorney.

(Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 7-8;

Tr. of September 20, 1993 Hearing at 25.)

6

On August 2, and again on August 3, 1993, LSI's attorney
contacted Kudlik and informed him that LSI continued to insist on
strict performance with the terms of the Lease and the Memorandum.
Specifically, LSI's attorney demanded that Kudlik immediately pay
all past due amounts in full, that he make all future payments on
time when due, and that he pay $2 00.00 in attorney's fees pursuant
to Section X of the Lease and Paragraph 4.g. of the Memorandum.
(R. 93; Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 7-8; Tr. of September
20, 1993 Hearing at 25.) LSI's attorney informed Kudlik that if he
did not cure the existing defaults and thereafter make payments on
time, LSI would pursue its eviction remedies.

(R. 93; Tr. of

September 8, 1993 Hearing at 7-8; Tr. of September 20, 1993 Hearing
at 25.)
Kudlik told LSI's attorney that he would call him back to
discuss the matter further.

(Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at

7-8; Tr. of September 20, 1993 Hearing at 25-26.)
called back.

Kudlik never

(Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 7-8; Tr. of

September 20, 1993 Hearing at 25-26.)
On or about August 19, 1993, Kudlik paid the June 1993 rent
(but not the July and August 1993 rent) to Escrow Specialists. (R.
197)

The next day, upon learning of Kudlik's failure to pay the

July 1993 and August 1993 rent, LSI served Kudlik with a Notice to
Quit by certified mail in full compliance with Utah Code Ann. §§
78-36-3 and -6. (R. 93; Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 8; Tr.
of September 20, 1993 Hearing at 26; Exhibit P-3 to September 20,
7

1993 Hearing, R. 169, 185.)

On August 23, 1993, LSI served Kudlik

with a second Notice to Quit by hand delivery and by United States
mail.

(R. 93; Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 8; Exhibit P-4

to September 20, 1993 Hearing, R. 169, 186.)

By these Notices to

Quit, LSI was, among other things, demanding payment of all pastdue rent.
Kudlik failed to pay the amounts due or to vacate and quit the
Premises.

(R. 93.)

On August 27, 1993, LSI filed its Complaint in

this action.

(Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 8.)

on

September

or

about

2,

1993, Judge

Regarding Possession Bond.

(R. at 93.)

West

Thereafter,

entered

an

Order

That same day, and again

on September 4, 1993, LSI served Kudlik with a Notice of Filing of
Possession

Bond

and

of

Remedies

Available

accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8.5.

to

Defendant

(Id. at 94.)

requested a hearing within three days after service.

in

Kudlik

(Id.)

On or about September 3, 1993, Kudlik filed a written Tender of
Performance to Plaintiff.

(Id. at 39-40.)

LSI objected to the

purported "tender" on the grounds, inter alia, that it is not a
remedy or right available to Kudlik under Utah's unlawful detainer
statute and that it did not include an amount for the September
rent then due, the accrued interest on the past-due amounts, and
the

attorney's

Memorandum.

fees

and

costs

owed

under

the

Lease

and

the

(Id. at 48-51.)

Judge West held a hearing on the possession bond issue on
September 8, 1993. At that hearing, LSI's attorney learned for the
8

first time that Kudlik had delivered a check the preceding Friday,
September 3, 1993, to Escrow Specialists in an amount equivalent to
two-month's rent.5

(See Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 5-6,

17; Tr. of September 20, 1993 Hearing at 9-10.)

LSI's attorney

objected to Kudlik's attempt to surreptitiously "cure" the defaults
by delivering a check for a portion of the rent and other monies
owed under the Lease and the Memorandum to Escrow Specialists after
the commencement of litigation.6
at 17.)

(Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing

Despite this objection and the commencement

litigation,

LSI's

attorney

indicated

that

of this

LSI still would be

willing to allow Kudlik to cure the defaults and retain possession
of the Premises, if done so within the time period specified by the
unlawful detainer statute.7

(Id. at 10-11.)

LSI's attorney stated

5

Kudlik erroneously gives this date as September 7, 1993.
See Brief of Appellant at 12.
6

Following the hearing, LSI's attorney contacted Escrow
Specialists and requested Escrow Specialists to determine if
Kudlik's check would clear. (Tr. of September 20, 1993 Hearing at
9-10.) Escrow Specialists called the bank upon which the check was
drawn and was informed that the account contained insufficient
funds to cover the check. (Id.) Upon receiving this information,
LSI's attorney returned the check to Kudlik's attorney.
(Id. at
10.)
7

LSI's attorney stated:
I think I am sympathetic to Mr. Anderson's position and I
think that my client, although they feel that they have
been strung along, would be—still be willing to allow Mr.
Kudlik to elect Option 2(a), which is to pay us within the
three-day period, and that period expires at the close of
business tomorrow. If Mr. Kudlik pays what the statute
requires him to pay and what he's obligated to pay under
the lease, I think Living Scriptures would be happy to
9

that the unlawful detainer statute gave Kudlik until the end of the
following business day.

(Id. at 10.)

Kudlik's attorney, however,

requested Kudlik be given until September 13, 1993 to pay.
35.)

(Id. at

Although, by statute, LSI could have insisted on a cure of

all defaults by September 8, 1993, LSI's attorney agreed to give
Kudlik until noon on September 13, 1993 to cure the defaults.

(Id.

at 36.)
Pursuant to the hearing, on September 13, 1993, Judge West
entered an Order Regarding Restitution ("Restitution Order").
at 66-69, 94.)

(R.

The Restitution Order provided that, in order for

Kudlik to retain possession of the Premises pending a further
hearing, Kudlik must pay the rent, late fees, and interest owing to
LSI and make a partial payment of the attorney's fees incurred by
LSI to date, by cashier's check to LSI's attorney by noon on
September 13, 1993.

(Id. at 68.)

In addition, the Restitution

Order required Kudlik to post a $5,000.00 bond to cover any issues
remaining in dispute, pending a further hearing.

(Id.)

In the

event Kudlik failed to make the required payments and to post the
specified bond, the Restitution Order provided that LSI would be
entitled

to

an order

of

restitution

of the

Premises.

(Id.)

Finally, the Restitution Order provided that a hearing would be
held at a later date to determine the following issues: the amount

work with Mr. Kudlik to try to keep him on track . . . .
(Id. at 10-11.)
10

of attorneys fees owing by Kudlik to LSI; the legal significance,
if any, of Kudlik's purported tender to Escrow Specialists; the
extent, if any, to which LSI's claims against Kudlik were barred by
the doctrines of estoppel and waiver; and any claim for damages
that either party may have against the other.

(Id. at 69.)

Needless to say, Kudlik failed to comply with the conditions of
the Restitution Order.

(Id. at 94.)

On September 20, 1993, Judge

West held a hearing to determine the two issues submitted by the
parties, i.e., the reasonableness of LSI's attorney's fees and
whether LSI had waived or would be estopped from requiring timely
performance from Kudlik based on Kudlik7s having made four late
rent payments late.

(Tr. of September 20, 1993 Hearing at 2-3.)

At that hearing, Judge West made a specific finding of fact that
LSI gave

Kudlik

reasonable

notice

before

insisting

on

strict

performance of payment terms of the Lease and the Memorandum.
at 94.)

(R.

In addition, Judge West determined that LSI had not waived

its right to timely performance under the Lease and the Memorandum,
that there was no basis for estoppel against LSI, (Tr. of September
20, 1993 Hearing at 32-33; R. at 95), and that Kudlik had been in
unlawful detainer of the Premises since August 27, 1993.8
September 20, 1993 Hearing at 33; R. at 95.)

(Tr. of

Accordingly, Judge

West entered an Order of Restitution directing Kudlik to restore

B

Judge West also found the attorneys fees claimed by LSI to
be reasonable.
(Id. at 36-37.) That finding is not at issue on
this appeal.
11

possession of the Premises to LSI, (R. at 81-82) , and ordered
Kudlik to pay the past-due rent, treble rent from August 27, 1993
to the date of the hearing, LSI's attorney's fees and costs, and
post-judgment interest.
V.

(R. at 98.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Kudlik's sole argument on appeal is that, as a consequence of
LSI's acceptance of four late rental payments, LSI has waived, or
should be estopped from asserting, its right to receive timely
performance under the Lease and the Memorandum.

Kudlik's argument

is without merit for at least three reasons. First, the concept of
waiver

or

estoppel

by

the

acceptance

of

late

payments

is

inapplicable where, as in this case, the parties have agreed in
advance that such conduct would not constitute a waiver.

In the

case at hand, the parties agreed in the Memorandum that a waiver by
either party of any breach was not to be construed as a consent by
that party to any future breach by the other party.
Second, Kudlik has failed to meet his burden of proof of
demonstrating the existence of either waiver or estoppel.

With

regard to waiver, Kudlik has failed to show that LSI's acceptance
of a few late rental payments is sufficient, in light of the
circumstances of the case, to support a reasonable finding that LSI
voluntarily and intentionally relinquished its right to terminate
the Lease upon Kudlik's continued failure to make timely payments
thereunder.

With regard to estoppel, Kudlik has failed to prove

the existence of any of its elements.
12

Specifically, Kudlik has

failed to prove (1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act
by LSI inconsistent with LSI's claim that LSI is entitled to
terminate the Lease as a result of Kudlik's failure to make
payments under the terms of the Lease and the Memorandum; (2)
reasonable reliance on the part of Kudlik; and

(3) an injury

resulting from LSI's conduct.
Third, even if this Court were to find that LSI temporarily
waived its right to receive timely payments under the Lease and the
Memorandum, or should be estopped from asserting that right absent
reasonable notice to Kudlik of its intent to require strict
compliance with the payment terms of the Lease and the Memorandum,
LSI gave Kudlik such notice. Following that notice, Kudlik neither
paid the past-due amounts nor complied thereafter with the payment
terms.

Accordingly, Judge West's ruling must be affirmed.
VI.

A.

ARGUMENT

Kudlik/s Assertion of Waiver or Estoppel is Barred by the
No-Waiver Provision in the Memorandum.
Although Kudlik correctly quotes the Restatement of Property

for the proposition that

n>

[t]he landlord may waive his right to

the prompt payment of rent by acting in such a manner that the
tenant is led to believe that a later date of payment than
specified in the lease is acceptable,'" Brief of Appellant at 8
(quoting Restatement (2d) of Property, Landlord and Tenant, § 12.1,
comment

c.

(1977)

[hereinafter

the

Restatement]),

Kudlik

conveniently fails to tell this Court that the quoted statement is
13

predicated on the absence of a no-waiver provision in the agreement
between the parties.

Indeed, the sentence immediately following

the one quoted by Kudlik provides:

"A no-waiver provision in the

lease preserves the landlord's right to the payment of the rent on
the due date."

Restatement § 12.1, comment c (emphasis added).

The Restatement applies that principle in illustrations 2 and 4 to
section 12.1.
Illustration 2 provides the general rule in the absence of a
no-waiver provision in the Lease:
L leases to T for five years, rent to be paid in advance
at the beginning of each month. The rent includes the
payment of the previous month's utility charges, but the
utility bill is regularly sent too late to be paid on the
first of the month. After a few months, T, without an
express agreement, begins paying his rent late enough in
the month to include the utility bill. L accepts each late
check without objection. L has waived the right to require
prompt payment of the rent, and T is not in default if he
continues his past practices.
If, however, L gives T
notice that the rent is to be thereafter paid on the first
of the month and T fails to comply, he will be in default
on his rent obligation. . . .
Id. , comment c , Illustration 2.
Illustration 4 explains the effect of a no-waiver provision in
the lease between the parties:9
9

Illustration 4 cross-references illustration 2, quoted
above, and Illustration 3, which provides as follows:
L orally leases an apartment to T from week to week, rent
to be paid in advance. For several months L calls at the
apartment each Sunday and picks up the rent check. For three
weeks L fails to pick up the checks, which are ready for him.
The relevant statute provides that if rent is in arrears for
fifteen days, whether demanded or not, the landlord may reenter
or recover possession of the premises. T finds L and tenders
14

Assume that the lease in Illustration 2 or in Illustration
3 contains the following provision:
"The waiver of one breach of any term,
condition, covenant, obligation, or agreement of
this lease shall not be considered to be a
waiver of that or any other term, condition,
covenant, obligation, or agreement or of any
subsequent breach thereof."
In such case T is in default in both Illustrations 2
and 3.
Id., comment c , Illustration 4 (emphasis added).
A number of courts have accepted the principle articulated in
the Restatement regarding the effect of a no-waiver provision. The
California Court of Appeals first relied on this principle in Brown
v. Chowchilla Land Co. . 210 P. 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 1922), a decision
quoted approvingly by the Utah Supreme Court in Pacific Dev. Co. v.
Stewart, 113 Utah 403, 195 P.2d 748 (1948).10
In Brown, the parties entered into a series of three separate
contracts for the purchase of real estate (the "Contracts") over a
term of seven and one-half years.

Brown, 210 P. at 424.

The

Contracts provided for monthly payments of principal and interest

the checks
the lease
conduct of
which were

to him. L refuses to take the checks, and declares
is terminated. T is not in default, because the
the parties established a time and manner of payment
followed by T.

Id. Illustration 3.
The lease in Stewart did not contain a no-waiver provision.
Therefore, the Utah Supreme Court did not have occasion
specifically to consider the effect of such a provision. The
Court's opinion is consistent, however, with the conclusion that
such a provision would have been given effect.
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on the first day of each month and (as with the Lease in this
appeal) stated that time was of the essence.

Id.

The Contracts

also specified that the purchaser's rights in and to the property
would terminate upon breach and gave the seller the option to
declare a forfeiture of all monies paid by the purchaser upon a
default in the payment of any sums due under the Contracts.

Id.

Finally, the Contracts each contained the following no-waiver
provision:
The waiver by the seller of any breach of any covenant
or agreement herein contained on the part of the purchaser
shall not be deemed or held to be a waiver of any
subsequent or other breach of said covenant or agreement,
nor a waiver of any other covenant or agreement herein
contained.
Id. at 425.
The purchaser made the first seven payments on time but then
made payments under the Contracts sporadically and in varying
amounts.

Id.

The seller accepted the purchaser's payments for

nearly five and one-half years without objection but then sent the
purchaser

a

notice

cancelling

the

contracts

purchaser's failure to make payments on time.

because

Id.

of the

The purchaser

brought an action for specific performance of the Contracts,
arguing that the seller had waived its rights to terminate the
Contracts without notice and an opportunity to cure by its extended
practice of accepting

late payments.

Id.

The trial court

disagreed, holding for the seller, and the purchaser appealed.

16

Although acknowledging the general rule that a vendor may waive
strict compliance with the payment terms of a contract by accepting
overdue payments without objection, the California Court of Appeals
held

the parties had

agreed

beforehand that such conduct would not constitute a waiver.

Id. at

427.

the principle

inapplicable

where

The court stated:
The requirement of notice after the receipt of overdue
payments without objection is based upon the equitable
consideration that by his conduct the vendor has led the
vendee into the belief that the former will continue to
waive the strict performance of the contract.
The
principle of equitable estoppel is involved.
But the
reason for the rule does not exist where the parties have
expressly agreed that such waiver shall not affect any
subsequent breach or relinquish the right of the vendor to
insist thereafter upon strict observance with the terms of
the contract.

Id.

The court found that the no-waiver provision in the Contracts

constituted an adequate expression of the parties' intent that the
acceptance of overdue payments was to be regarded as an indulgence
to the purchaser, and not as a waiver of the seller's right to
timely performance of the Contracts.11

Id.

Accordingly, the court

held that the seller retained the right to declare a forfeiture
11

Specifically, the court stated:
The parties could not fail to understand from the
particular covenant in question that the acceptance of any
overdue payment or payments was to be regarded as an
indulgence to the vendee, but as to the future the whole
contract remained in full force and effect and rendered
the vendee subject to the penalty of forfeiture for any
default thereafter.

Id. The court upheld the parties' legal right to agree to such a
provision. Id.
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upon the purchaser's failure to make timely payments, without
providing the purchaser with advance notice of its intent to
strictly enforce the payment terms of the Contracts.

Id.

The California Court of Appeals reached the same result in the
context of a commercial lease in Karbelnig v. Brothwell, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966).

In Karbelnicr. the parties entered

into a written lease for the rental of certain real property for a
term of fifteen years.

Id. at 3 36.

The lease contained both a

provision prohibiting assignment by the tenant without the consent
of the landlord and a no-waiver provision.12

Id.

Despite the

existence of the provision prohibiting assignment, the tenant
assigned its interest in the lease without the consent of the
landlord.

Id. at 336-38.

Upon being notified of the assignment,

the landlord accepted rental payments from the assignees, but
notified the tenant that such acceptance should not be construed as
an acceptance or waiver to the assignment.

Id. at 338. The trial

The no-waiver clause provided:
The waiver by Lessor of any breach of any term, covenant,
or condition herein contained shall not be deemed to be a
waiver of such term, covenant, or condition or any
subsequent breach of the same or any other term, covenant,
or condition herein contained. The subsequent acceptance
of rent hereunder by Lessor shall not be deemed to be a
waiver of any preceding breach by Lessee of any term,
covenant, or condition of this lease, other than the
failure of Lessee to pay the particular rental so
accepted, regardless of Lessor's knowledge of such
preceding breach at the time of acceptance of such rent.
Id.
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court held such conduct constituted a waiver of the breach.

Id. at

339.
The California Court of Appeals reversed.
court began with the proposition that

Id. at 340.

The

fl

[w]aiver is the intentional

relinquishment of a known right after knowledge of the facts." Id.
The court then noted that the intent to waive a breach normally may
be inferred by the acceptance of rental payments after learning of
the breach.

Id.

Looking to decisions from other jurisdictions,

however, the court held that such an inference is rebutted where
the parties agreed in the lease that the acceptance of rent is
without prejudice to the rights of the Landlord.13

Id.

The court

explained:
The express agreement on the part of the lessees, which
was binding upon their assignees, to the effect that the
acceptance of rent by the lessor after knowledge of the
breach of a covenant should not be deemed a waiver of such
breach, is tantamount to a relinquishment of the right of
the lessees and their assignees, to assert a waiver of
[sic] estoppel, unless there has been an express waiver on
the part of the lessor of the right reserved, or there has
been conduct on the part of the lessor, other than the
acceptance of rent, upon which the lessees or their
assignees could lawfully assert an estoppel to declare a
forfeiture.
Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
In the case at hand, the parties agreed that a waiver by either
party of a breach by the other shall not be construed as a waiver

13

The court distinguished other California decisions that
found waiver as the result of the acceptance of rent, noting that
none of those decisions involved the existence of a no-waiver
provision in the leases at issue. Id. at 340.
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of any

other

or subsequent

breach.

Paragraph

4.d.

of the

Memorandum specifically provides:
Any waiver by any party hereto of any breach of any kind or
character whatsoever by any other party, whether such
waiver be direct or implied, shall not be construed as a
continuing waiver of, or consent to, any subsequent breach
of this Agreement on the part of the other party.
Any inference of intent by LSI to waive its right to timely
performance of the Lease and the Memorandum is precluded by the
existence of the no-waiver provision in the parties' agreement.14
By

agreeing

to

such

a

provision,

Kudlik

voluntarily

and

intentionally relinquished his right to assert a waiver or estoppel
against LSI based on the LSI's acceptance of past-due payments.
LSI relied on the above no-waiver provision in an attempt to work
with Kudlik instead of immediately terminating the Lease and acting
to evict him, which right was specifically granted to LSI in
Paragraph 3 of the Memorandum.

In these circumstances, Kudlik is

precluded as a matter of law from arguing waiver and estoppel
against LSI. Judge West's ruling must therefore be affirmed.
B.

Kudlik Has Failed to Meet His Burden of Demonstrating Either
Waiver or Estoppel,
Even assuming, arguendo, that this Court were to find that

Kudlik is not precluded from arguing waiver or estoppel by his

14

Moreover, as discussed below, intent to waive its right to
timely payment may not be inferred against LSI as a result of its
acceptance of a few late rental payments, particularly where LSI
urged Kudlik to make his payments on time and promptly acted to
enforce its rights when it became clear that Kudlik was unwilling
or unable to do so.
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express agreement to the no-waiver provision, Judge West's ruling
must be affirmed because Kudlik failed to meet his burden of proof
of

demonstrating

either

waiver

or

estoppel.

The

record

overwhelmingly supports Judge West's ruling that neither doctrine
precludes LSI from asserting its rights under the Lease and the
Memorandum.
1.

The Record Clearly Demonstrates that LSI Did Not Waive its
Right to Insist on Timely Payments Under the Lease and the
Memorandum.

Waiver is " x the intentional relinquishment of a known right. 7 "
Soters v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 939-40
(Utah 1993) (quoting Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808
P.2d 1069, 1073 (Utah 1991)).
elements:

(1) an existing

As such, "[w]aiver requires three
right, benefit, or advantage;

(2)

knowledge of its existence; and (3) an intention to relinquish the
right."

Id. at 940. Because waiver is an affirmative defense, the

burden of demonstrating each of its elements, including intent,
lies with the party asserting it—Kudlik.

See Utah R. Civ. P.

8(c); Bezner v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898, 901
(Utah

1976) .

Kudlik

must

show

from

relinquishment was "clearly intended."

the

evidence

that

the

Soters. 857 P. 2d at 941. In

the case at hand, Kudlik failed to sustain his burden of showing
the existence of waiver.

Judge West's ruling must, therefore, be

affirmed.
Kudlik 7 s sole evidence in support of his waiver argument is
LSI's acceptance of four late rental payments.
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Conspicuously

absent from Kudlik 7 s argument, however (and which Kudlik would like
this Court to ignore), are the agreement between the parties, the
context

in

which

the

four

payments

were

accepted,

the

communications between the parties, and all of LSI's actions to
enforce the Lease and the Memorandum.
In January of 1993, when Kudlik first began to slip into a
practice of making late payments, LSI acted immediately to get
Kudlik back on track and to emphasis that LSI insisted on timely
payments under the Lease. To that end, LSI and Kudlik entered into
negotiations to cure the past defaults. The parties 7 agreement was
memorialized in the Memorandum.

The Memorandum required payment of

all past-due amounts according to a strict payment schedule and set
forth in no uncertain terms that LSI insisted on strict compliance
with the payment terms of the Lease.

Accordingly, Paragraph 1 of

the Memorandum provides, in relevant part:
Any payment hereunder or under the Lease which is not
received by LSI on or before its due date shall not be
timely made and shall constitute a breach,
(R. 182 f 1 (emphasis added).)

Similarly, Paragraph 2 of the

Memorandum provides, in relevant part:
Kudlik shall make all other payments which are or become
owed under the Lease in full and on time.
(Id. at J 2 (emphasis added).)
From the time the parties entered into the Memorandum until the
commencement of this action, LSI's actions were consistent with its
intent to require strict compliance with the payment terms of the
22

Lease and the Memorandum.

During the first few months following

the execution of the Memorandum, LSI continually "bird-dogged"
Kudlik to try to get him to honor his agreement.
8, 1993 Hearing at 7.)

(Tr. of September

It soon became clear to LSI, however, that

they would have to resort to legal action to persuade Kudlik to
meet his payment obligations.

At that point, LSI contacted its

attorney, who promptly called Kudlik, on two separate occasions, to
demand

that

he

immediately

bring

his

payments

current

and

thereafter comply strictly with the payment terms of the Lease and
the Memorandum.

(R. 93; Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 7-8;

Tr. of September 20, 1993 Hearing at 25.)

On August 20, 1993,

after no response from Kudlik, LSI served Kudlik with a Notice to
Quit.

(R. 93; Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 8; Tr. of

September 20, 1993 Hearing at 26.)

Three days later, LSI served

Kudlik with a second Notice to Quit.15
8, 1993 Hearing at 8.)

(R. 93; Tr. of September

Kudlik did not respond to either Notice to

Quit, leaving LSI with no alternative but to commence this action.
(R. 93; Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 8.)
As the above actions show, LSI did not silently accept Kudlik7s
late payments. Instead, LSI insisted Kudlik make timely payments,

15

After serving the Notices to Quit, LSI learned that Kudlik
made a partial payment to Escrow Specialists on August 19, 1993 of
only one month's rent, omitting the July and August rent then past
due, as well as the late fees, interest, and attorney's fees, which
he was obligated to pay under the Lease and the Memorandum. (R.
197.)
LSI accepted this partial payment in mitigation of its
damages.
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and

each

time

Kudlik

refused,

culminating in this lawsuit.

LSI

escalated

its

remedies,

The entire process, from Kudlik 7 s

first late payment following his execution of the Memorandum to
LSI's filing of this action, took only a little over six months.
LSI gave Kudlik no false assurances that he could continue to flout
his obligations.

Instead, every communication between the parties

during this time reiterated LSI's insistence that Kudlik make his
payments on time.16
16

Each of the cases cited by Kudlik that found a waiver are
factually inapplicable to this case. For example, in Pacific Dev.
Co. v. Stewart, 113 Utah 403, 195 P.2d 748 (1948), the seller
accepted late payments from the purchasers over a period of
approximately two years, without any objection, all the while
assuring the purchasers that "no forfeiture of their rights was at
that time contemplated, but that they should x do the best you can 7
or they should catch it up as fast as they could." Id. at 749.
Similarly, in Morris v. Sykes, 624 P. 2d 681 (Utah 1981), the
parties were negotiating a reinstatement of the contract up to the
time of unilateral termination by sellers, id. at 682-84, and in
Tanner v. Baadscraard, 612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980), the seller and
purchaser had continually communicated regarding the purchasers
anticipated purchase of the property up to the point when the
seller informed the purchaser, for the first time, that he had
arranged the sale of the property to another. Id. at 346-47.
Grow v. Marwick Dev. , Inc. . 621 P.2d 1249 (Utah 1980), did not
involve the acceptance of late payments, but holds merely that
where a seller under a real estate contract sent the purchaser two
notices of default and a notice of forfeiture, to which the
purchaser did not respond, and thereafter sent a subsequent notice
of default giving the purchasers 15 days to cure, the seller's
latter notice controlled. Id. at 1251-52. Similarly, Hansen v.
Christensen, 545 P. 2d 1152 (Utah 1976), did not involve the
acceptance of late payments, but rather holds that where a real
estate sales contract offered the seller several alternative
options upon default, none of which were self-executing, the
purchaser is entitled to believe the contract continues in force
until the seller elects a remedy and notifies the purchaser of the
election. Id. at 1154. Finally, the cases of Girard v. Appleby.
660 P.2d 245, 248-49 (Utah 1983), Minshew v. Chevron Oil Co.. 575
P.2d 192, 194-95 (Utah 1978), and Woodland Theatres. Inc. v. ABC
24

The record is clear in the case at hand that LSI acted in
accordance with the parties7 agreement that past waivers would not
be construed as a continuing waiver or consent to a future breach
and

attempted

to

work

terminating the Lease.

with

Kudlik

instead

of

immediately

When, after a reasonable period of time,

those efforts proved ineffective, LSI acted promptly to enforce its
rights.

The record overwhelmingly supports Judge West's ruling

that LSI did not intentionally waive its right to insist on strict
compliance with the payment terms of the Lease and the Memorandum.
LSI respectfully requests that this Court affirm Judge West's
ruling.
2.

Kudlik Has Failed to Meet His Burden of Demonstrating
Estoppel.

Like waiver, estoppel is an affirmative defense.
Civ. P. 8(c).

See Utah R.

As such, Kudlik bears the entire burden of

demonstrating the existence of each of its elements.

Corporation

Nine v. Taylor, 30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d 417, 420 (1973).

Kudlik

has failed to meet his burden as to this affirmative defense.
Whereas waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known
right, estoppel is a doctrine that precludes parties from asserting

Intermountain Theatres, Inc., 560 P.2d 700, 701-02 (Utah 1977), all
hold merely that a party may not both declare a forfeiture of a
lease and, at the same time, continue to accept rental payments
during the period following the declaration of forfeiture. This is
so despite the landlord's attempt to alter the rule by a unilateral
declaration that the acceptance of rent does not constitute a
waiver. See Girard, 660 P.2d at 248-49; Woodland Theatres, Inc.,
560 P.2d at 701.
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their rights where their actions or conduct would render it
inequitable for them to do so. Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P. 2d 430, 432
(Utah 1983).

Estoppel requires proof of the following three

elements:
(i) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party
inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable
action or inaction by the other party taken or not taken on the
basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or
failure to act; and (iii) injury to the second party that would
result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate
such statement, admission, act, or failure to act.
CECO v. Concrete Specialists, Inc.. 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah
1989) . Kudlik has failed to prove any of these elements.
First, Kudlik has failed to show a statement, admission, act,
or failure to act on the part of LSI that is inconsistent with
LSI's insistence on compliance with the payment terms of the Lease
and the Memorandum.

Kudlik has made no allegation and offered no

evidence that LSI expressly stated that it would not insist on
compliance with those terms or that LSI made any admission contrary
to

such

insistence.

Rather, Kudlik

argues that LSI's mere

acceptance of four late rental payments is inconsistent with its
present assertion of the right to terminate the Lease based on
Kudlik7s continued failure to timely make subsequent payments.
LSI's actions are completely consistent with such an assertion.
As discussed above, during the time period in question, LSI
attempted time and again to get Kudlik to make timely rental
payments.

As each attempt failed, LSI escalated its actions,

finally bringing this lawsuit.

LSI in no way misled Kudlik into
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believing that LSI would not act to terminate the Lease in the
event Kudlik continued to ignore his payment obligations.

To the

contrary, LSI insisted, at every juncture, that Kudlik comply with
those provisions.
Second, Kudlik has failed to offer any evidence whatsoever that
he actually relied on any actions of LSI.

Kudlik failed to even

proffer evidence that he could have made the rental payments on
time, but chose not to based on LSI's acceptance of four late
payments.

Moreover, even assuming for the sake of argument that

Kudlik did in fact rely on LSI's acceptance of those four late
payments,

Kudlik

has

failed

to demonstrate

that

such

claimed

reliance was reasonable in light of the no-waiver provision in the
Memorandum and LSI's continual "bird-dogging" efforts.

As noted

above, Kudlik expressly agreed in the Memorandum that a waiver by
LSI of any past breach would not constitute a waiver of any future
breach.

Kudlik makes no allegation that the parties waived that

provision, either expressly or by any conduct other than that which
the

parties

Kudlik's

expressly

claimed

agreed

reliance

would

on

not

LSI's

constitute

temporary

a waiver.

forbearance,

therefore, was not reasonable, even if actual.
Finally, Kudlik has failed to demonstrate that his claimed
injury resulted from his purported reliance on LSI's waiver of past
overdue payments.

Specifically, as noted above, Kudlik failed to

proffer any evidence to the trial court that he could have made the
rent payments on time in the absence of any such reliance.
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In

light of such failure, and of Kudlik's failure to establish the
existence of the other elements of estoppel, Kudlik7s claim of
estoppel must

fail.

Judge West's ruling must

therefore be

affirmed.
C.

Even if LSI Temporarily Waived its Right to Timely Payment
Under the Lease and the Memorandum, Which LSI Did Not, LSI Gave
Kudlik Reasonable Notice of its Intent to Require Compliance
with Those Terms in the Future.
Kudlik argues, without any foundation in fact, that "[w]here a

landlord

routinely,

and without

objection,

accepts

past due

payments and leads the tenant to believe that strict adherence to
the payment schedule will not be required, the law requires the
landlord to provide the tenant with reasonable notice that it will
insist on strict performance."

Brief of Appellant at 7.

Even

assuming the validity of that statement and its applicability to
the case at hand, however, Kudlik has no reason to complain in the
present case because LSI did not routinely accept late payments
without objection and LSI gave Kudlik reasonable notice of its
intent to require

strict compliance with

the Lease and the

Memorandum.17

17

As discussed above, LSI's acceptance of four late payments
was far from a "routine" practice, and the acceptance was not
"without objection." During the period of these four payments, LSI
was continually "bird-dogging" Kudlik to bring his payments current
and to thereafter make them in a timely manner. Furthermore, in
light of the no-waiver provision agreed to by the parties, LSI's
conduct could not reasonably be construed as "leading the tenant to
believe" that strict compliance with the payment terms would not be
required.
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LSI accepted

the last rental payment

on August

19, 1993,

leaving at least two months of rental payments past due.18

The

following day, and again on August 23, 1993, LSI caused a three-day
Notice to Quit to be served on Kudlik.

Kudlik did not comply with

either Notice, thereby forcing LSI to file this action on August
27, 1993.
On September 2 and 4, 1993, LSI served Kudlik with a Notice of
Filing of Possession Bond and of Remedies Available to Defendant,
which included the option of full payment within 3 days after
service.

Kudlik did not choose that option, but instead requested

a hearing.

At the September 8, 1993 hearing, however, LSI's

attorney indicated LSI's continued willingness to allow Kudlik to
cure his defaults, if done so within the time-frame set forth in
the unlawful detainer statute.
at 10-11.)

(Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing

LSI's attorney suggested payment by the end of the

following day.

(Id.) Kudlik's attorney, however, requested Kudlik

18

Despite Kudlik's contention that LSI "accepted" a rental
payment on September 3, 1993, the evidence demonstrates otherwise.
First, LSI returned Kudlik's check to Kudlik's attorney. (Tr. of
September 20, 1993 Hearing at 9-10.) LSI was entitled to refuse
tender of payment following Kudlik's breach of the Lease and the
Memorandum. See Shoemaker v. Pioneer Invests. , 14 Utah 2d 250, 381
P.2d 735, 736 (1963). Second, the check was drawn on an account
that contained insufficient funds to pay it. (Tr. of September 20,
1993 Hearing at 9-10.) A bad check does not constitute "payment,"
and mere receipt of a bad check does not constitute "acceptance" of
payment. Moreover, it is ridiculous for Kudlik to claim, for the
purpose of arguing waiver or estoppel, that he relied on such an
"acceptance" when the purported payment was made after the filing
of the Complaint in this action and LSI's efforts to recover
possession of the Premises.
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be given until the following Monday, September 13, 1993.
35.)

(Id. at

LSI's attorney agreed to this request, giving Kudlik until

noon on September 13, 1993 to cure the defaults.

(Id. at 36.)

Thus, Kudlik had 21 days from the August 23, 1993 Notice to Quit
(24 days from the August 20, 1993 Notice to Quit) in which to cure
the defaults.

Kudlik did not do so.

Therefore, Kudlik 7 s argument

that he was not given a reasonable time to cure the defaults must
be rejected.

Judge West's ruling should be affirmed.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The essence of Kudlik's argument is that LSI should not have
worked with him, but rather LSI should have immediately invoked its
rights under the unlawful detainer statute on the first day after
Kudlik was late on his next payment.

Kudlik asked Judge West, and

is now asking this Court, to punish LSI for having worked with
Kudlik in "bird-dogging" him to bring his payments current.

Kudlik

shamelessly makes this argument despite the fact that he and LSI
specifically agreed in the Memorandum that LSI's acceptance of late
payments would not constitute a waiver and despite the fact that
LSI

went

to

obligations.

extreme

measures

to

prompt

Kudlik

to

honor

his

To add insult to injury, Kudlik makes his argument

without any showing whatsoever of any reliance on his part, either
actual or reasonable, on any actions of LSI.
As set forth above, LSI went to extreme measures to encourage
Kudlik to honor his obligations under the Lease and the Memorandum.
Kudlik should not be rewarded by this Court for his ability to
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manipulate LSI's kindness.

Kudlik had failed to carry his burden

of proof as the affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel.
LSI therefore respectfully urges this Court to affirm Judge
West's ruling.

LSI also requests that this Court award LSI the

costs, including reasonable attorneys fees, incurred in responding
to Kudlik's appeal.

See Judge West's award of attorneys fees,

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 91-96); Final Judgment
(R. 97-99); Augmented Judgment Regarding Attorneys' Fees (R. 110111); Lease § X (R. 142-53); Memorandum f 4.g. (R. 154-56); Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1992).
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Tab A

LEASE

THIS

LEAGE, made

between Myrtle M.

to

cti LeabuL

this t-ywr*"day

of

June,

1S85, by *IK1

Crouch r a single women, heit-inaf te£

axid Jay

Aiidtiii^uii and

Dale

Minsonr

L^£^±LL\±6

severally

and jointly, hereinafter referred to as Lessee.
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS,

the

Lesser

owns

certain

property

located in

Ogden City, Weber County, State of Utah, which property is
presently leased to American Oil Company, and,
WHEREAS,

American

Oil

Company

is

not

utilising

the

premises, and,
WHEREASr it is contemplated by Lessor that the American
Oil

Company

will

agree

to

terminate

their

Lease

with

the

Lessor or allow the Lessee to take possession of the premises
subject to the conditions and provisions of this Lease, and,
WHEREAS,

the

Lessee

desires

to

lease

said

property

for the construction of a car wash facility;
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants
and agreements herein contained, the parties agree as follows:
I.
mance
to

by

PREMISES

In consideration of the f^i^hfnl perfor-

of the covenants and considerations hereinafter agreed
Lessor and Lessee, the Lessor does hereby

lease and

demise to the Lessee the following described premises situated
in the City of ogden, County of Wefcer, state of Utah, mere
particularly described as follows, to-*?it:.
Lots 25, 2S, 27 and 28 in Block 42 NELSON PARK ADDITION
to Oqden City, Weber County, Utah.
iL£ T. Bftowtrme
>THT w. BiACJtaumr {
mJLx Ft. BALDWIN
ON R. KUHZLEX
T Q U K C r S XX V A V /
( WASNIK&TON PJ.V?. I
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I

II.

TSJRM.

Subject to earlier termination by th« oper-

ation of any forfeiture clause or other right rp.sftnzp^ herein,
the tern of this Lease shall be for a perfnn of twenty (20)
I years•

Said

Lease

tarn to

commence

at

t-he termination

of

[} the present Lease ber.vraftn thp Lessor and American Oil Comoany
*

it

|i

!

or at such time as Aiasricsn Oil Company enters into an aare»ment

with

Looser

L*39<*e. allowing

and

X C L Liie cammenceinent

of Lhis Lease,
j

III.

PAlMJKNT AND CHAKSJBS.

The monthly

Lease payment

for the first tive (b) years ot this Lease shall be an amount
of Twelve Hundred Dollars, ($1,200-00) per month.
I lease

payment

for

the

be adjusted each two
I year and

remaining

each

two

(2) years

the balance of the Lease term.
lease

of

Consumer

the

being

the

payment

payment

for the

years

shall

Index

for

(6th)year

based

the

of the parties

sixth

thereafter^

through

The amount of the adjusted

shall be made

Price

intention

(15)

(2) years commencing on the sixth (6th;

continuing

monthly

fifteen

The monthly

on

the increase

previous

that

shall

period.

the montnly

be increased

It

lease
by

the

percentage increase of the Consumer Price Index for the first
five

(5) year period.

The adjustment for the monthly lease

payment for year eight
the percentage

(8) and nine

(9) shall be based on

increase of the Consumer Price Index for the

previous two (25 year

period, and so nn through the remaining

years of the Lease.

Notwithstanding the above, it is acjrssd

between the parties that the amount o£ increase for any t-?c
(2) year

period

shall

not exceed

35* loi

seventh year or 14% for any subsequent two

Lhe
year

SX-KLK

and

period.

Page 3*
|f It

is

turther

agreed

between

the parties

that at no time

during the term of this Lease shall the monthly lease payment
decrease, whether or not the Consumer Price Index is negative*
Monthly

lease

payments

shall

be

paid

in

advance

and

shall commence upon the effective date of this Lease.
Any
ten

payment

which

is

not

paid

to

the

Lessor

within

(10; days after the due date shall bear interest at the

rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum for the due date until
said sum is paid in full.
The Lessee agrees to pay all real property taxes when
due

and

ail

other

assessments

on

the

property

during

the

entire term of this Lease.
IV.

PROCEDURE FOR PAYMENT.

The monthly lease payment

shall be paid and delivered to the Lessor tc Lessor's savings
account
2406

in

the

MountainWest

Washington

SG1-Q2S82S-14

Blvd.,

or at

Savings

Ogden,

and

Utah,

such other placs

Loan

Association/

savings

account

as the Lessor may froT.

time tc time designate in writing.
V-

INSURANCE.

Concurrent

with

the

effective

day

o£

this Ledse, the Lessee sh^ll ubLdiu IJLUIU e± £*» liable insurance

company authorized to do business in the state of Utah, and
shall maintain in full force and effect during the term cf
this Lease a policy or policies of insurance for public liability en the premises in a sum not less that One Hundred
Thousand Dollars, ($100,000-00).
VI.

OSE OF

PKEMISE5.

The

leased

premises

shall be

Page 4 used for the construction and operation of a car waqh.
Lessee

agrees

to

indemnify

Lessorls

prnppri-y "From all

demands.

actions,

costs

and

save

harmless

r.l;H.rn*r mechanic

and

charges

Lessor and

lions, damag-QC,

arising

reason of the erection and construction

The

out

of tha

of

or

by

improvements

herein contemplated and the operation or the business herein
authorized

on

the

y-Leiiiises

Liei.t»in d^iiii^eu

dutiny

Lhe

lem.

ot t m s Lease and any extensions thereafter,
VII.

LESSEEf S ASSIGNMENT OR SUBLEASE.

It is agreed

between the Lessor and the Lessee that the Lessee may not
assign this Lease or sublet the premises without the consent
of the Lessor, which consent shell not be unreasonably withheld.
VIII*
beyond

HOLDOVER.

In the event Lessee shall hold over

the expiration

of the term herein provided, it is

expressly understood and agreed that any such holdover tenancy
shall be a month to month tenancy only, and either Lessor
or Lessee may terminate such tenancy at any time by giving
the other party thirty (30) days written notice of its intention to do so.
IX.

BANKRUPTCY.

In the event of any default in the

performance of any of the covenants on the Lessee's part
to be Vppt or in th*. event of abandonment by the Lessee or
the lawful holder of the Lease, shall be judicially &ecl*r*rinsolvent, or if any petition is filed in or any proceeding
commenced
If
,VC ~ ITHY W .

BROOMING
BUCKDUWC j

OH R. <CUK£L-ER
T f ^ C Y S AT LAW
%A.WNCTON OL.VD. (J

under the

bankruptcy

laws

by said Lessee or the Lessee holder r

of

the

united Scatcc

or if a ye Li Lion for

Page 5•
nfefuxyanization be filed by the .Lessee, or any execution be
Issued against it, or any of its effects, and the same

be

net vacated, satisfied, bonded or discharged, as the result
of which the demised premises may be taken or if a receiver
or trustee be appointed of its property by a Court of competent
jurisdiction
contested,
shell

ard

said

make

an

said

appointment

appointment
assignment

has

for

is

not

become
the

contested,

or if

final/ or if Lessee

benefit

or

creditors

or

if the interest of Lessee shall be sold at a judicial sale,
then in any of such event, it shall be lawful for the Lesser,
and the Lessor is hereby given the right to terminate this
Lease

on

ten

(1C) days written

notice

to

that effect and

at the end of such period the term hereby granted shall immediately

cease, terminate

and

come

to an

end as fully as if

the entire period herein provided had expired.
X.

COSTS FOR DEFAULT.

In the event either the Lessor

or the Lessee commences legal action against the other claiming
a

hrpar.h

such

or

litigation

reasonable

nf

npfsn^
shall

attorney's

this

T.PSSP,

bo entitled
fees

and

to

+*he prpvsiling
recover

ell costs

from

p^rty
the

in

other

connected with said

liLiydLiux:-

xi.
all

NOTICE,

notices

given

properly served
by certified

it is further understood and agreed that
under

this

if delivered

Lease

shall

be deemed

to be

in writing personally, or sent

mail to Lessor or Lessee

at his then current

address.
XII.

SUCCESSOR

IN

INTEREST.

The

terms,

conditions

Page 6.
and covenants of this Lease shall be binding upon and shall
inure to
heirs,

the benefit

personal

assign*,

and

of each of the parties

representatives,

sh«n

run with

one party shall be K « w
whenever used

successor's

the

land;

and

hereto, their
sublessees

or

whftr* more than

»«*** this Lease, the word "Less**"

in this Lease shall be deemed to include all

parLiss of leasee jointly and severally.
XXI1_

RIGHT CF FIRST REFUSAL TO PURCaRSE.

is nereby given the righx of first
Leased

property

together

property presently cwned

with

refusal

the

tc purchase the

adjacent

by tne Lessor.

The Lessee

and

adjoining

The right of first

refusal includes the entire parcel of property owned by the
Lessor
only

and

the

Lessor

does

real

not

include

property

receives

an

any

subject

offer

to

smaller

to

this

purchase

parcel
Lease.

the

including
After

entire

the

property

as set out above, written notice of said offer shall be given
to the Lessee and Lessee shall have fifteen
the date of the written notice to exercise
of

refusal

provision

to

purchase

contained

the

herein,

property.
the

(15) days fro*
its first

right

Notwithstanding

Lessor

may

transfer

any
the

property to any of her children as part of their inheritance
without being

subject to this provision.

Any

such transfer

shall bind said child to the provisions of this Lease including
thP right of

first refusal.

XV.

TIME.

IN

WITNESS

this document
ALE T- SftSWNlK©
OTKT W . SLACKOyaN
MCtXT R. BAUCWIK
TTUMHtrS

AT UAW

j

Tim© 5.« r>? th<* fissence of this Lease.
WHEREOF,

to be duly

the

parties

executed,

in

hereco

have

™ns«d

triplicate, with ail

Page 1.
the formalities required by lav on the respective date set
forth above.

MYRTLE M. CROUCH,LESSOR

JAY ANDERSON,LESSEE

JUULK T* l « O W N ( M «
IOTMT W. BUACMMUmH
AJHJCT R- PALDWIff
RON a . KUNZUft

SENT BY:

1 ^0-92 ; 7:41AM :
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ASSIGNMENT OP LEASE AND CONSENT OP LESSOH
Agreement made September 18, 1989 between Jay Anderson
and Dale Minson, City of Ogden, County of Weber, State of
Utah, herein referred to as assignor, and Alan Shaw of City
of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, herein
referred to as assignee*
RECITALS

1. Assignor entered into a lease, as lessee therein,
on Juno 26, 1985 with Myrtle Crouch, a single women, herein
referred to as lessor•
2. Assignor desires to assign, and assignee desires
to assume all of the right, duties, and liabilities of lessee
thereunder.
In consideration of One Dollar ($1.00), receipt of
which is acknowledged by assignor, assignor assigns the
lease to assignee effective September 19, 1989 for the balance
of the lease term of 20 years provided in the lease. The
lease commenced on June 26, 1935*
Assignee shall assume all rights and duties required
of assignor under the lease including all payments required
thereby and shall comply with all terms and conditions of
the lease, and hold the Assignor harmless.
CONSENT OF LESSOR
Myrtle Crouch and/or her representative, lessor in
the above-described lease, consents to assignment and transfer
of the lease, including all terms and conditions thereof,
to assignee.
This Assignment does not release Jay Anderson or Dale
Minson from the original Lease.

JtJll

1

OI

IN WITNESS
Agreement this

"0-32 ; 7:41AM ;

WHEREOF, the parties have
day of September, I989.

ASSIGNOR

fl* Uivkw*^

Dale Minson
ASSIGNEE

Alan Shaw
LESSOR

Myrtle Crouch by her representative

3940635;* 3/ 3

signed

this

AMENDED LEASE
The parties Myrtle M. Crouch, Lesser, and Alan Shaw,
Assignee, hereby amend the June 26, 1985 lease as follows:
If Lessor decides Lo sell the corner lot, Alan shaw
shall have the first right to puTh*se said lot. The purchase
price stall be the price Lesser places on the property.
The balance of the lease dated June 26, L9S5, shall
remain in full force and effect.
Dated this

day of April, 1990.

hi »&

2to /£n.~,.*J

MXfiTI-E M. CROUCH,

•

Lessor

ALAN SHAW, Assignee

ASSIGNMENT OF L2AS2 AMD
CONSENT 0? LESSOR
Agreement made February. 15, 1991, between Alan Shaw,
City of Ogcen, cour-ty of Weber, state of Utah, herein referred to
as assignor, and MichaelJohn Kudlik, City of Sell Lake, coun.y of
Salt Lake, State of Utah, herein referred to as assignee.
RECITALS
1.
Assignor r e c e i v e d an Assignment of Lease on
September 13, 19Sr, of a ip.ase d a t s d June 26, 1985 i n which Myrtle
Crouch, a s i n g l e woman, i s the l e s s o r (a copy of which t h e assigr.es
has r e c e i v e d ) .
2. Assignor d e s i r e s t o a s s i g n , and a s s i g n e e d e s i r e s t o
assume a l l of t h e r i g h t , d u t i e s , and l i a b i l i t i e s of l e s s e e
t h e r e u n d e r . This Assignment, s h a l l not r e l i e v e t h e a s s i g n o r of a i l
c f t h e r i g h t , d u t i e s , and l i a b i l i t i e s of l e s s e e should t h e a s s i g n e e
d e f a u l t i n any of t h e terms o£ t h e l e a s e .
In c o n s i d e r a t i o n cf One Dollar ',•?!. 0 0 ) , r e c e i p t cf which
i s acknowledged by a s s i g n o r , a s s i g n o r a s s i g n s t h e l e a s e t o a s s i g n e e
e f f e c t i v e February 16, 1991, f o r t h e b a l a n c e of t h e l e a s e term cf
20 y * a r s provided i n t h e l e a s e . Thp. l e a s e commenced on June 26,
1985.
Assignee s h a l l assume a i l r i g h t s and d u t i e s r e q u i r e d of
a s s i g n o r under t h e l e a s e i n c l u d i n g a i l payments r e q u i r e d thereby
*nd s h a l l comply with a l l Lerms and c o n d i t i o n s of t h e l e a s e , and
hold t h e assignor harrcip-ss.
CONSENT OF LESSOR
Myrtle Crouch and/or her r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , l e s s o r ir. the
above described I s c s e , consents t o assignment and t r a n s f e r of tr.e
l e a s e , including a i l terms and couOiUons t h e r e o f , t o a s s i g n e e .
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I N WITNESS WHEH20P, the parties
Agreement this .^WTVI <*ay °f July , 1991.

have

signed

this

ASSIGNOR

M./

Alan Shaw

w£-

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to hfifnre mo this
July

, lssi.

or

NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE CFITVW
MyCgiRi&soiEtpns
Feb.\»y5.1004

ROEYNVV. JOHNSON
3776S»uftHigi»f*Qt
SattU*tCiar,UahKta6

^^G^^yv-^
W0TAR5T 1>UBEIC

Residing at/ Ogden, Utah

My Commission.' C^g-Iuc.:??

620^

:>
ASSIGNEE

J0&4u

/

y^firchaej^ohn Kudlik
SUBSCRIBED and sworn Lu before me t i u s
July,

1991-

NOTARY PUBLIC
^

STKTSOFUTAH

)
/

'roso^5,1DC5
R0SY»W. JOHNSON
3775SoufoHiahtencfQf,

San Lab Oy. UUh s«06

My Commission .-:xpi r*.s:

NOTARY PURL

1 Residina a\

LESSOR

^rtlji Crouch by her
Myrtlji
her
reoresentative
SUBSCRIBED and oworn t o befoLe ine

this

dav o:

July , 19S1,

My Commission Expires:

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at Ogden, Utah

TabB

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
(Michaeljohn Kudlik)
THIS MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ("Agreement") is made and entered into in
Ogden, Utah, as of the 25th day of January, 1993, by and between Living Scriptures, Inc., a Utah
corporation with a place of business at 4646 South 1500 West, Ogden, Utah 84405 ("LSI"); and
Michaeljohn Kudlik, an individual and doing business as California Suds with a place of business at 4700
South 900 East, Suite 30-165, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 ("Kudlik").
Background
On or about June 26, 1985, Myrtle M. Crouch, as lessor, and Jay Anderson and Dale Minson,
as lessees, entered into a Lease agreement (the "Lease") with respect to certain real property located at
3685 Harrison Boulevard in Ogden, Utah (the "Property") for purposes of lessees constructing and
operating a car wash facility. LSI has recently purchased the Property and is the assignee of all of
lessor's rights under the Lease. Kudlik is the assignee of lessees' rights and obligations under the Lease;
prior lessees have not been relieved of their obligations under the Lease. In conjunction with LSFs
purchase of the Property, Kudlik and others waived the first right of refusal to purchase the Property and
adjoining property. Under the terms of the Lease, Kudlik is obligated to pay all real property taxes and
assessments on the Property during the term of the Lease. LSI has paid the 1991 and 1992 real property
taxes, and associated penalties and interest, in the total sum of $8,426.94, and has incurred attorneys'
fees. LSI has demanded payment of such amounts from Kudlik.
Agreement
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants herein set
forth and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt, adequacy and legal sufficiency of which
are hereby acknowledged, the parties mutually agree as follows:
1.
Payment bv Kudlik. Kudlik shall pay to LSI the full amount of Eight Thousand Four
Hundred Twenty-Six and 94/100 Dollars ($8,426.94) as follows:
a.
Two Thousand Eight Hundred Eight and 98/100 Dollars ($2,808.98) on or before
February 1, 1993; and
b.
Two Thousand Eight Hundred Eight and 98/100 Dollars ($2,808.98) on or before
March 1, 1993; and
c.
Two Thousand Eight Hundred Eight and 98/100 Dollars ($2,808.98) on or before
April 1, 1993.
All payments shall be made to LSI at the following address: P.O. Box 9576, Ogden, Utah 84409.
Payments hereunder shall be deemed made by Kudlik when actually received by LSI. Any payment
hereunder or under the Lease which is not received by LSI on or before its due date shall not be timely
made and shall constitute a breach.
In the event that Kudlik foils to timely make any payment in full as due under this Agreement,
LSI may make and declare, without any notice to Kudlik, the entire principal hereof and all other charges
hereunder, whether or not then due, to be immediately due and payableforthwithand interest shall accrue

APPENDIX B

on the then entire outstanding principal amount hereof and all amounts due under the Lease at the rate
of eighteen percent (18%) per annum from the date hereof until paid in full, both before and after
judgment. Kudlik hereby expressly waives any defense, offset, recoupment, reduction and/or
counterclaim and any right of defense, offset, recoupment, reduction and/or counterclaim for or on
account of any reason or event whatsoever to any liability of Kudlik under this Agreement and/or the
Lease.
2.
Lease Payments. Kudlik is also delinquent with respect to the January 1993 Lease
payment. Kudlik shall pay to LSI the full amount of the January 1993 Lease payment of One Thousand
Four Hundred Twenty-Eight and No/100 Dollars ($1,428.00) on or before February 1, 1993. Kudlik
shall also pay to LSI the full amount of the February 1993 Lease payment of One Thousand Four
Hundred Twenty-Eight and No/100 Dollars ($1,428.00) on or before February 10, 1993. Kudlik shall
make all other payments which are or become owed under the Lease in full and on time.
3.
Event of Default. In the event that Kudlik fails to timely make any payment in full as
due under this Agreement or the Lease or is otherwise in breach or default under the Lease, LSI may,
without any notice to Kudlik and in addition to any other rights and remedies available to LSI under this
Agreement, under the Lease, in equity or at law, immediately terminate the Lease and all of Kudlik's and
his predecessors' rights thereunder. Any such termination shall be effective upon a declaration by LSI
to that effect or upon LSFs sending to Kudlik a notice to that effect.
4. Miscellaneous.
a.
Entire Agreement. This Agreement constitutes the entire understanding between the
parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all negotiations, representations,
prior discussions and preliminary agreements between the parties hereto relating to the subject matter of
this Agreement. This Agreement shall be interpreted and construed as if drafted and prepared by all
parties hereto.
b.
Governing Law. This Agreement shall be deemed to have been executed in the State of
Utah, and shall be interpreted, construed and enforced in accordance with and governed by the laws of
the State of Utah, without giving effect to any conflict of laws provisions, and each party hereby submits
to the exclusive personal jurisdiction of the courts situate in Ogden, Utah, with respect to any and all
claims, demands or causes of action asserted or filed by any party against any other party relating to, or
arising out of, the subject matter of this Agreement.
c.
Binding Effect. This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the
parties and their heirs, executors, administrators, successors, legal representatives and assigns; provided,
however, that Kudlik may not assign any of his rights or obligations hereunder or under the Lease
without LSFs prior written consent.
d.
Waiver. Any waiver by any party hereto of any breach of any kind or character
whatsoever by any other party, whether such waiver be direct or implied, shall not be construed as a
continuing waiver of, or consent to, any subsequent breach of this Agreement on the part of the other
party.
e.

Severance Clause. The provisions of this Agreement are severable and should any
-2-
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provision be void, voidable or unenforceable under any applicable law, such void, voidable or
unenforceable provision shall not affect or invalidate any other provision of this Agreement, which shall
continue to govern the relative rights and duties of the parties as though the void, voidable or
unenforceable provision were not a part hereof. In addition, it is the intention and agreement of the
parties that all of the terms and conditions hereof be enforced to the fullest extent permitted by law.
f.
Survival. All warranties, representations, indemnities, covenants and other agreements
of the parties hereto shall survive the execution, delivery and termination of this Agreement.
g.
Attorneys Fees. If a legal action or other proceeding is brought for enforcement of this
Agreement or because of an alleged dispute, breach, default or misrepresentation in connection with any
of the provisions of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorneys
fee (in-house or otherwise) and costs and expenses incurred, both before and after judgment, in addition
to any other relief to which they may be entitled.
h.
Acknowledgement. Kudlik specifically represents and warrants to LSI that the statements
set forth in the Background above are true and correct; Kudlik has had the opportunity to consult with
independent legal counsel with respect to the advisability of executing this Agreement; and, in executing
this Agreement, Kudlik does not rely on any inducements, promises or representations of LSI or any
agent of LSI other than the terms and conditions specifically set forth in this Agreement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement as of the day and year first
set forth above.
Living Scriptures, Inc.,
a Utah Corporation

B
v: P^-W^Its: S*r/r>p>2j-,s
'

kudlik.agt
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, Micha^ijtJnn Kudlik,
SZL^A^P
individually
and doing business as California Suds
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